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ABSTRACT
Crowdsourcing is a process wherein an individual or an organiza-
tion utilizes the talent pool present over the Internet to accomplish
their task. e existing crowdsourcing platforms and their rep-
utation computation are centralized and hence prone to various
aacks or malicious manipulation of the data by the central entity.
A few distributed crowdsourcing platforms have been proposed but
they lack a robust reputation mechanism. So we propose a decen-
tralized crowdsourcing platform having an immutable reputation
mechanism to tackle these problems. It is built on top of Ethereum
network and does not require the user to trust a third party for a
non-malicious experience. It also utilizes IOTA‘s consensus mecha-
nism which reduces the cost for task evaluation signicantly.
KEYWORDS
Crowdsourcing, Blockchain, Reputation
1 INTRODUCTION
Je Howe rst coined the term crowdsourcing, describing it as ”the
act of a company or institution taking a function once performed
by employees and outsourcing it to an undened network of people
in the form of an open call” [7].
Several crowdsourcing platforms have emerged in the past decade
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk [1], Upwork [5], Topcoder [4].
ese platforms oer numerous advantages such as reduced cost,
beer quality, and lower task completion time. Because of these
advantages, tasks ranging from as simple as data annotation to
as complex as soware development are being crowdsourced. In
general, there are two types of crowdsourcing platforms: (1) hiring
based, in which the workers apply for a task. Aer the application
process is over the task poster chooses workers from the set of ap-
plicants, to work on the task. e number of workers depends upon
the requirement of the task poster. Only the selected workers are el-
igible for the reward, upon successful completion. (2) Competition
based platform, where there is no worker selection initially. Any
number of workers can work on a task. But the reward is awarded
to the best one which is generally decided by the task poster. In
this paper, we focus on hiring based crowdsourcing platform which
comprises of three entities, namely the task poster who needs to
get a task completed, the worker who takes up the task to complete
it and the verier checks for the accuracy, quality, etc. for the task
completed by the worker. e entities involved along with the basic
workow followed by the platform is shown in Figure 1.
Majority of the existing crowdsourcing platform such as Upwork,
Topcode, AMT, etc. follow a centralized management approach;
that is, they have a central authority through which all the activities
are managed. Here, central authority refers to the people or the
organization managing the platform. e central authority charges
a fee as a part of geing a task done over the platform. Also,
there is an assumption that the central authority is trustworthy,
which always needs to be correct[27]. ere can be aacks on
central authority either by outsiders or insiders who can maliciously
manipulate data[27]. Moreover, there might be privacy concerns
to the user upon how his/her information will be used. In some
instances, user certication authorities have been shown to turned
unreliable [49]. Some crowdsourcing platforms require the task
poster to deposit the reward amount before beginning with the
tasks. is gives central authority an undue opportunity of deciding
how it can use the money. In the worst case, they may take away the
money without users consent [38] or may not reward the worker
suitably on successful completion of the task.
Even if we assume that central authority is trusted, there is a
need to establish trust among the task poster and the worker for the
success of the platform [22]. One of the important aspect of trust
comes from the reputation of the individual users of the platform.
e majority of existing studies have approached this from the
perspective of a centralized crowdsourcing platform [31, 42]. On
such platforms, integrity and authenticity of the reviews received
and reputation scores computed cannot be guaranteed as all the
control resides with the central entity and it is easy for them to
manipulate it.
In this paper, we propose a blockchain based design philosophy
for a crowdsourcing platform. Blockchain based design principles
model any system, that involves any form of transactions among
entities, as a decentralized transaction management system where
transactions are hashed cryptographically, validated based on con-
sensus, stored by multiple entities subscribed to the system and
are immutable. Bitcoin [35] is one of the very famous application
of blockchain. We show the feasibility of the proposed system
with Ethereum [15] based implementation of the platform. e key
contribution of our work is: (1) a decentralized crowdsourcing plat-
form, (2) a publically observable, robust and immutable reputation
mechanism.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefs
about the related work and section 3 describes the layout of our
design. Section 4 explains how each step of the crowdsourcing
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Figure 1: Entities and Various steps of Crowdsourcing plat-
form
process is carried out and 5 explains how reputation on the plat-
form is updated. e experiments performed and their result is
mentioned in section 6 and the analysis on how the platform over-
comes various aacks is stated in section 7. Section 8 talks about
the conclusion and future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
With the rise in conventional workforce moving towards gig-economy
[8] there has been widespread conceptualization of it in dierent
areas ranging from social science and humanities [25] to soware
engineering [34].
Various challenges of centralized crowdsourcing platform such
as trust management [22, 23, 28, 42–44, 46], incentive mechanism [24,
30, 44, 50], quality control [11, 13, 36, 48], privacy and security [40,
41, 45] have been taken up in literature.
On the other hand aacks and their corresponding defense on
reputation systems have also been studied in the literature. Inter-
connecting reputation system and social networks [26] or clustering
similar users [39] has been suggested as a remedy to overcome the
problem of cold start. Unfair rating aack can be avoided by using
statistical measures to exclude such ratings [19] or by weighting
the rating by rater’s reputation [17] or comparing it with rating
provided by some trusted agent apriori [29].
Work on distributed reputation system by [12] wherein they have
presented a privacy-preserving reputation mechanism by using a
pseudonym for users rather than their actual identity and requires
a certication authority for authentication. It also keeps discarding
old reviews and provides no mechanism to prevent or handle an
unfair rating. Zacharia in [47] proposes to use the most recent
rating received by the user from the rater to overcome the collusion
aack, but this might not be reective of its past behavior and
it would be easy to manipulate the rating.Authors in [16, 20, 37]
propose reputation systems that leverages blockchain. Carboni
in [16] associates fees with every feedback the seller wants. is can
reduce the review that is given for transactions that have not been
performed but does not eliminate it. And might be burdensome
for the seller. Authors in [37] have focused on computing the
reputation of the seller on an e-commerce platform using reviews
(rating as well as textual) that he/she received. Each review is bound
to a transaction and reviewer anonymity can only be guaranteed if
several transactions are to be reviewed which involves the seller in
a given time. Ways of overcoming biased reviews have not been
proposed. Dennis and Owen in their paper [20] use IP addresses
to bind the identity of the user. Spoong IP addresses is fairly
easy now. To avoid collusion aack they are taking an average
of the scores received by the worker. Since averaging is sensitive
towards the outlier, it might reduce the eect of collusion but does
not eliminate it.
Paper by Li, et al [32] is the most related to our work. ey
have proposed a crowdsourcing platform built on Ethereum and
task assignment is done on a rst come rst serve basis which
might result in poor quality and they have not touched much upon
evaluation of the submission. ey have proposed a reputation
management scheme but have not looked upon various aacks that
can occur. e other work that is similar to ours is of [33]. ey
have proposed a crowdsourcing platform leveraging blockchain and
that largely focuses on preserving privacy and anonymity of their
users. However, they have not presented a reputation mechanism
for their system and require users to have a new account for every
transaction on the system. Both the above implementations require
the central authority for authenticating user identity and issuing
pseudonyms to the users.
We propose a crowdsourcing platform that is decentralized and
does not rely on third party for its core functionalities and it is built
on top of Ethereum. It also has an added advantage of reduced cost
as the task poster is not required to pay to any central agent to
get his/her task done. We also try to prevent some of the various
aacks on the reputation system, mentioned above, by building a
stronger evaluation methodology.
3 OUR MODEL
WorkerRep is modeled as a hiring based crowdsourcing platform.
ere are mainly two entities on our platform (1) the task poster and
(2) the worker. Unlike most of the crowdsourcing platforms, where
a task is evaluated by task poster, in WorkerRep tasks are evaluated
by peer workers present on the platform. Based on their skills and
reputation on the platform, they are pseudo-randomly selected for
task evaluation. To evaluate is to judge if the submission by their
co-worker satises the task requirements or not.
3.1 Terminology
In this section, we describe various aacks and other terminologies
used in the paper.
Reputation is the measure of how well the worker has performed
in the tasks that were previously assigned to him and how well
he evaluates the work done by others. Initialization and Cold Start
Problem is faced by the new users on the platform to raise their
reputation score initially.
Sybil aack is an aack where a malicious worker tries to cre-
ate multiple identities over the platform to gain inuence on the
platform. Generally, It is done to carry out some of the below-
mentioned aacks.
• Re-entry aack carried out by creating a new identity on
the platform, leaving an identity with a bad reputation.
Generally, reputation lower than what is for a new worker
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Figure 2: Proposed crowdsourcing platform architecture
• Collusion aack is when a group of workers tries to collude
together to improve their own reputation or decrease the
the reputation of others.
• Ballot Stung is when the worker tries to increase its own
reputation.
Unfair rating aack is when the rater is biased towards the
worker and does not give a truthful opinion about him. If it is biased
in a negative sense, that is rater tries to decrease the reputation of
the worker it is known as bad-mouthing.
Reciprocity is when the worker reciprocates negatively for a
negative review that he receives.
Whitewashing aack happens when either the worker knows
how to manipulate the reputation system or by re-entering the
system.
3.2 Layout
Since our proposed system is built on top of Ethereum network, a
smart contract is the most fundamental building block for it. Our
system has ve kinds of smart contracts: (1) UserContract: contains
functionalities to create new users on the platform. (2) TaskContract:
it oers functionalities to create a new task as well as view the
existing tasks on the platform. (3) AgreementContract: creates an
agreement between the task poster and the worker corresponding
to a given task. (4) SubmissionContract: the worker invokes the
functionalities of this contract when he/she has nished the task
he/she was assigned and is ready to submit. e basic functionality
of this contract is to accept submission from the worker and the
assigned evaluators for that submission. (5) EvaluationContract:
provides various functionalities to the evaluators of the tasks. It
also computes and updates the reputation of workers based on the
evaluation score received from the evaluators. e architecture of
the system is shown in Figure 2.
To perform any action on the platform the user has to call the
function of the contract corresponding to that action. If the function
call results in a change of state of Ethereum Blockchain then the
function call is treated as a transaction from the one calling that
function. Transactions on Ethereum network are cryptographically
signed using an asymmetric encryption algorithm to prevents non-
repudiation of the origin of the transaction as well as to maintain
the integrity of the data. Miners on the other hand, can decrypt
the transaction using the initiator’s public key. Aer decrypting it
they verify the validity of the transaction and if found valid, these
transactions are appended to the public ledger. ese transactions
cost Ethers to the user and interactions with the Ethereum network
are carried out by using MetaMask [3]. MetaMask is an application
that acts as a bridge between the browser and Ethereum. Using
MetaMask saves users from installing the Full Ethereum node on
their local system as it uses the full nodes from Infura [2]. In Figure
1, function calls corresponding to steps colored in green are treated
as transactions and carried out on Ethereum blockchain and the
ones in orange that are task search and apply for a task do not
involve appending transaction to the Ethereum blockchain.
4 PROCESS
Subsections below dene how each of the steps mentioned in Figure
1 is performed on our platform.
4.1 User Registration
Users register on the platform as a worker or task poster and specify
his/her public key and the IPFS[14] hash of their information. Inter-
Planetary File System(IPFS) is a peer to peer storage systems that
uses the hash of the data as it‘s address. Ethereum wallet address
is used to register on the platform. A user can have multiple ad-
dresses and its corresponding public-private key pairs from a single
Ethereum wallet account. Since each user is linked to a particular
address and public-private key pair, the users created from dierent
key pairs will be dierent. So to avoid a Sybil aack, we ask the user
to pay some amount of Ethers while registering. Authors[21] have
shown that if there is a cost associated with generating identity, the
Sybil aack is greatly reduced. Another way to avoid a Sybil aack
is to associate an identity with the user, but it requires a third party
to validate the identity. We use the former approach to handling
the Sybil aack due to the following reasons. Firstly, including a
third party contradicts our architecture of a decentralized system.
Secondly, asking for a fee initially would keep spammers away
from our system, and only those who are interested will be joining
the platform. e Ethers taken as a fee from the user are stored in
their account on the platform and can be returned when the user
leaves the platform. e amount returned to the user depends on
the reputation the user has at that point in time.
4.2 Post Task
To post a task, the task poster species the reward for the task, title,
skills required and the IPFS hash of the task metadata and sends
the transaction. Upon the transaction being mined, the task gets
appended to the public ledger as a transaction carried out by the
task poster and to the list of available tasks in the TaskContract. is
step is incorporated within the Ethereum network so that further
transactions happening for this task such as assigning the task to
the worker, submission by the worker, etc., can be linked to it. It
will help ease the verication process carried out by other task
posters before assigning a worker to their task.
4.3 Task Search
Once a task is posted, it is added to the list of available tasks for
workers to perform. All the available tasks and their relevant details
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are public and available for view. Workers can apply lters on the
collection of available tasks to aid them in choosing tasks.
4.4 Task Registration
In this step, a worker can choose to apply to an available task posted
on the platform. By applying, a worker can express his interest in
that task. Details of workers who have applied for the tasks are
visible to task posters and these can help the task poster in choosing
worker(s) for their task.
4.5 Worker Selection and Task Assignment
Selecting the most suitable worker from the applicants is a time-
consuming process. e task poster can initially lter out workers
based on their reputation score. From those selected aer ltering
based on reputation, the task poster can go through their proles
and evaluate them. Once the task poster has selected worker/s for
his/her task, he/she creates an agreement using the AgreementCon-
tract specifying the worker information within it. e agreement
here is a binding structure between worker and task poster for a
given task that can enforce the rules of the system associated with
the task such as acceptance, submission, reward, and the updates
to reputation. While creating the agreement, the task poster is
required to send the reward amount for that task, to this agree-
ment. is amount can only be withdrawn if the worker has not
accepted the task and the task poster wants to cancel the task or
can be awarded to the worker upon completion of the task. Since
there is no central authority involved the money is kept safe in the
contract and will be awarded to either of the two entities involved
in the agreement based on the above-mentioned condition. Leing
task posters send in money while creating assignments will help
in avoiding task posters to assign numerous tasks at a time, hence
spamming the network and also avoid task poster denying to pay to
the worker upon satisfactory task completion. Aer the agreement
is successfully created, the selected worker is notied for him/her
to accept it and start working on it. ese transactions are recorded
in the Ethereum.
4.6 Task Acceptance
Once the task poster assigns the worker to the task by creating an
agreement, the worker is notied of the same. To accept the task,
the worker is required to send in some xed amount of Ethers to
that agreement. e Ethers that are deposited by the worker will be
refunded on successful completion of the task. Upon receiving the
Ethers from the worker the contract code will check whether the
address of the sender of those Ethers is the same as worker address
specied by the task poster while creating that agreement. If it is
the same, the task poster will be notied of the acceptance and the
worker can start working on the task else the gas corresponding to
that transaction will be consumed. e task can be accepted by a
specic date mentioned by the task poster, post which the agree-
ment will stand canceled automatically and all the Ethers residing
in that agreement will be sent to the creator of that agreement,
which is to the task poster. Post this date the worker will not be
able to accept the agreement. is is done so that the task poster
does not keep waiting for an innite time for the worker to accept
the agreement and the task poster can receive the Ethers back and
use them to assign the task to another worker. Just so the task
poster does not explicitly kill the agreement in the middle, we keep
a check if the worker has accepted the agreement. If he/she has
paid, then the contract cannot be killed by the task poster, and it
will only get terminated once the due date is reached. Collecting
Ethers from the worker when he is accepting the task works as an
assurance to the task poster that the worker would not leave the
task halfway. Since if he does not complete the task, the Ethers
submied by the worker will be transferred to the task poster aer
the due date as compensation. And if he does the submission, the
fees returned will depend on the completeness of the submission.
4.7 Submission
Aer the worker has completed the task, he can submit the solu-
tion/submission by invoking the functions from the Submission-
Contract. Initially, the worker hashes the submission using the
Keccak-256 hashing scheme and sends it to the agreement before
the due date. Hashing performed by the worker is not part of the
Ethereum network. e worker performs if o blockchain, explic-
itly. Since any action that is performed on Ethereum is publically
visible and we do not want to make the submission public. is hash
received by the AgreementContract serves two purposes (1) it helps
the platform know that the worker has completed his/her work
and is ready to get evaluated. (2) It helps prevent the worker from
changing his submission upon knowing who his/her evaluator will
be. So, upon receiving the hash, evaluators are pseudo-randomly
chosen as discussed in the section below and their public keys are
returned to the worker. Evaluators are not notied to the worker
initially as it may introduce bias in his work if someone he knows
becomes the evaluator of his task.
For each evaluator, the worker then encrypts the submission
using the public key of that evaluator which is then encrypted by
his/her own private key and is then stored on IPFS. e submission
is not stored on blockchain due to (1) cost involved to store large
data on the blockchain network is high. (2) Privacy concern, the
task poster might be reluctant to share the submission with the
public. e hashes received by storing the encrypted submission
for each individual evaluator are combined and then returned to the
AgreementContract by the worker. e rst level of encryption pro-
vides condentiality as nobody other than the evaluator having the
corresponding private key can access the submission. e second
level of encryption provides authentication of the worker. e case
where evaluators explicitly share the submission with someone else
can not be handled by our system. Encryption or decryption is not
secure on blockchain since the keys become publically visible as
in the case of hashing the submission as discussed above so, it is
performed o blockchain at the user side. Storing the encrypted
hash once for each worker consumes a lot of space. Instead, we
can store the submission once over IPFS and perform the two-level
encryption as described above to the hash received from the IPFS
rather than performing it on the worker’s submission itself. is
would greatly reduce the space required on the IPFS as the number
of evaluators increase but such a scheme can result in privacy and
security issues as anybody with the hash can access the submission.
4
4.8 Evaluation
Evaluation on the existing crowdsourcing platforms is generally
performed by the task poster itself. We propose a dierent model
in which workers on the platform evaluate the submission of their
peer workers and we also assume that the number of workers ac-
tively participating on the platform is suciently large. A worker
evaluates a task when (1) the worker wants to get his submission
evaluated and (2) the worker is willing to evaluate the submission
given he/she has a suciently high reputation. Our design requires
the worker to evaluate y other submissions before his submission
gets evaluated. Here y can depend on various factors such as the
diculty of the task the worker has successfully submied, the
diculty of the tasks the worker is being assigned to evaluate, num-
ber of tasks that are yet to be evaluated, number of workers who
are ready to evaluate and reputation of the worker. One advantage
of using this kind of evaluation model is that, as the number of
nodes increases in the network, the eciency of submission evalu-
ation increases. Such an evaluation model has been borrowed from
IOTA’s consensus model [6]. In the rst case, various incentives
for the worker to perform evaluation are that he does not have
to pay fees to get his submission evaluated, he might learn new
things that could be helpful for him in the future and there is an
increase in reputation upon correct evaluation of peer’s submission.
In the second case, the incentive to evaluate others’ submission
is, to get their reputation increased and to learn. An increased
reputation score in the laer case can easily be abused by a worker
with a lower reputation as they would nd this as a swi option
to boost up their reputation. To prevent this, a worker who has no
submission that is pending for evaluation and has a low reputation
score is not allowed to evaluate other’s submissions. Only work-
ers whose reputation is above a threshold are allowed to evaluate
tasks if they have no pending submission to be evaluated. Further,
this threshold can be altered dynamically to adjust to the current
requirement of the number of evaluators. For our implementation,
we have considered the threshold to be the average reputation of
the workers on the platform.
ere are two parts of review given by each evaluator (1) e
score, it comprises of two metrics, completeness and quality. Eval-
uator rates the submission, a value between [1, 100] on both the
metrics. One means poor performance and 100 means excellent
performance. A range from 1 to 100 has been chosen because the
oating-point division is not yet possible in solidity and such a
range provides a balance between precision and memory require-
ments. (2) Textual review, a brief explanation of the rating given
by him/her.
Since peer workers are evaluating the task, there are chances that
the evaluation may not be a true reection of the work done by the
worker due to unfair rating or collusion between the worker and the
evaluators. To avoid it, we assign a total of x evaluators to each task
and take a consensus about their evaluation score to provide the
worker with a fair evaluation. e incentive of increased reputation
score as mentioned above might prompt the evaluator to randomly
assign evaluation score to a submission. To decrease the eect of
such random evaluation and unfair rating, the consensus among
the evaluators is taken and the incentive of increased reputation
is received by only those evaluators that are part of the consensus.
Consensus mechanism is explained in section 5.
e number of evaluators for a given submission can depend
on various factors such as the complexity of the task which can be
measured in terms of the duration required to complete the task,
the number of workers available to evaluate the task which further
depends on the number of people with the required skill and rep-
utation, the number of workers who have to get their submission
evaluated and the number of workers having the required repu-
tation and willing to evaluate the submission. Once the number
of evaluators is known, we next consider how they are chosen.
For a given task, workers having the skill to evaluate that task are
divided into slots based on their reputation score. e number of
slots depends on the number of evaluators required for that task.
Evaluators are then randomly chosen, one from each slot, assuming
there always exists at least one worker in all the slots. e advan-
tages of using this method are (1) allowing an evenly distributed
pool of evaluators from dierent reputation scores to get beer
evaluations. (2) prevents workers who have made a submission
and have a low reputation score from starving due to them not
being allocated a task for evaluation, resulting in their task not
being evaluated. (3) reduced probability of colluding workers being
chosen together to evaluate the same task as successful collusion
will require the colluding workers to rstly be in the list of eligible
evaluators. Secondly, they would be required to be distributed in
the reputation slots in such a way that would increase the chances
of one of them geing selected from at least half of the slots. e
collective eort and nances required to arrive at such a state far
exceed the benets that could be derived from it.
5 COMPUTING REPUTATION AND
ASSIGNING REWARD
ere are two ways through which the reputation of the worker
gets updated (1) by completing a task and (2) by evaluating other’s
submission. Initially, the reputation of the worker is set to 1. Per-
formance of the worker in every task that he/she has completed
or evaluated, adds to their reputation on the platform. e repu-
tation of the worker based on his/her submission is dependent on
the credibility of the evaluators and the score he/she receives for
his/her submission. Likewise, when he/she evaluates a submission,
then reputation depends on how close his/her score is to the score
assigned to the worker.
5.1 Completing task
As mentioned in section 4 there are two criteria based on which the
evaluators score the worker, which is completeness and quality. Let
e1, e2, … , en be the set of evaluators chosen pseudo-randomly and
cik and qik be the completenessScore and qualityScore respectively
given by the ith evaluator for kth submission. e mean of the
completenessScore and qualityScore suggested by the evaluators is
denoted by cm and qm . Considering cm and qm as a measure of
completenessScore and qualityScore wont be the correct as there
might be malicious evaluators trying to collude or provide other
workers with an unjust score. So to nd and remove such mali-
cious workers that are outliers among the evaluators, we compute
the standard deviation cs of the completenessScore and qs as the
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standard deviation of qualityScore specied by the evaluators. Eval-
uators whose score is beyond a certain threshold away from the
mean in any of the two metrics, we tag him/her as an outlier. Re-
maining evaluators are said to form a consensus. e evaluation of
the submission of the evaluators who are found to be outliers is not
considered. is helps to deter evaluators from maliciously increas-
ing or decreasing other worker‘s reputation. If consensus is not
reached, evaluators are reassigned and the above-mentioned steps
are repeated. ere can be beer outlier detection methodology
but due to the limited computational power provided by Ethereum,
we stick to this methodology.
Once the consensus is reached, the scores given by the evaluators
on two dierent criteria are combined. Let completnessScorejk and
qualityScorejk represent the consensus of the evaluator on the
completeness and quality,respectively, of the submission k made
by worker j. completeScorejk and qualityScorejk can be computed
using equation 1 and 2, respectively.
completeScorejk =
∑ec
i=0 cik ∗ ri∑ec
i=0 ri
(1)
qualityScorejk =
∑ec
i=0 qik ∗ ri∑ec
i=0 ri
(2)
Here ec represents the number of evaluators in consensus and
cik and qik are the scores for completeness and quality respectively
given by the ith evaluator for kth submission. Each of their scores
is supported by the credibility of that evaluator. Credibility is
measured in terms of the reputation of the evaluator on the platform
and is represented as ri for ith evaluator.
Hence the nal evaluation score f inalScore jk assigned to the
jthworker for a kth submission is the weighted average of score
received in the two criteria. e weight assigned to these criteria
can be decided by the task poster and sums up to 1. Suppose wc is
the weight assigned to the completeScorejk and wq is the weight
assigned to the qualityScorejk . en f inalScore jk is calculated as
:
f inalScore jk =
wq ∗ qualityScorejk +wc ∗ completeScorejk
wq +wc
(3)
Upon computing f inalScore jk , it is then sent to the worker as a
transaction. By sending a transaction to the worker we are trying to
maintain a chain of reviews the worker has ever got on the platform.
is makes it easier for anybody to prove the existing reputation
of the worker. In this case, no central party can maliciously alter
the reputation score, and no worker can fake its reputation on the
platform. e score received by the worker is then added to the
reputation of the worker.
e reputation is updated only if the worker makes a submission
and it is not altered in the case when the worker accepts the task
and does no submission.
5.2 Evaluating submission
e other way of increasing reputation is by evaluating the sub-
mission made by peer workers. e score received by the eval-
uator upon evaluating a task depends on how far is its evalua-
tion for quality and completeness for a given submission from the
completnessScorejk andqualityScorejk received by the worker. Let
the score received by evaluator i upon evaluating submission k be
represented by eScoreik . It can be computed using equation 4
eScoreik =
200 − qualityScorejk − qik  − completeScorejk − cik 
2
(4)
5.3 Updating Reputation
For every submission the worker does, he/she is required to evaluate
y other tasks represented by v . Let α be the weight assigned to the
score that the worker receives upon evaluating other submissions
to get his/her lth submission evaluated. And let (1- α ) be the weight
assigned to the score that the worker receives for his lth submission.
e value of α is taken to be 0.25 as authors[18] found that giving
25 % weightage for evaluating performance of their peers provided
them sucient motivation. en the total reputation increased of
the worker by doing submission and its correspoding evaluation is
given by equation 5
repScorejk = (1 − α)f inalScore jk + α
∑ |v |
b=0 eScorejb
y
(5)
On the other hand, if the worker j is willing to evaluate even
though he has no pending submission to be evaluated, then the rep-
utation score increased for that particular submission k‘s evaluation
is given by equation 6
repScorejk = α ∗ eScorejk (6)
Both the above cases consider only those workers that are not
outliers. But when the worker is an outlier, in the laer case the
workers are decentralized as their reputation is decreased. e
decrease is proportional to their eScorejk and is given by equation
7
repScorejk = −α ∗ eScorejk (7)
For the former case, the worker is required to correctly evaluate
the tasks before his task can get evaluated. Since evaluators are
randomly chosen, the probability of him/her geing the next task
early in time is low, hence delaying his submission to be evaluated.
5.4 Reward
e reward received by the worker wholly depends on the f inalScore jk
he receives for his submission. If task reward as posted by the task
porter for task t is taskRewardt then the reward received by the
worker j for submission k corresponding to task t represented as
rewardjk and can be computed using equation 8
rewardjk =
f inalScore jk ∗ taskRewardt
100 (8)
Apart from the reward, the worker also gets back the fee (ac-
ceptanceFees) that he/she paid while accepting the task. e fees
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returned (f eeReturnedjk ) to the worker depends on the complete-
ness of the submission and is computed using equation 9
f eeReturnedjk =
completeScorejk ∗ acceptanceFees
100 (9)
e reward and the acceptance fee that remains are sent to the
task poster.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To perform experiments and test the performance, validity and
other parameters of our system, we have developed an implementa-
tion on Ethereum blockchain using solidity which is a programming
language used to develop smart contracts. e resulting implemen-
tation was organized into 5 dierent contracts with each smart
contract handling a specic group of functions related to our sys-
tem, details for which have already been described in Section 4.
We also developed a front end web interface that makes it easy
for our users to interact with our platform and also can hide the
complexity behind the function calls. We have used web3.js, which
is a collection of Ethereum JavaScript API libraries that enable
our front end to connect to and talk to our smart contract on the
Ethereum blockchain. For creating the user interfaces and views
we have used Reactjs, a popular JavaScript library for creating user
interfaces and Metamask has been used for signing transactions.
While our system is not tied to any particular storage system, we
have used IPFS in our implementation due to its decentralized and
distributed nature. Our frontend interacts with IPFS via ipfs-api
which is its JavaScript API and using this API allows us to add and
retrieve les from IPFS.
When a worker registers on our platform, he or she is expected
to provide an IPFS link (hash) to his/her prole or portfolio which
contains information that would be helpful to task posters while
choosing workers for their task. Also while registering, a worker
is expected to provide a fee as a deposit which we have chosen in
our implementation to be ether equivalent of $5 (0.0118 ether at
the time of writing).
Once solidity code is compiled, all the functions are converted
into low-level assembly opcodes suitable for the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM). e gas cost or cost of executing each of these
low-level operations is xed and dened in the Ethereum yellow
paper. So the gas cost for any function is a measure of the cost
of its processing requirements and for any function or any other
particular ow of control, the amount of gas required for its success-
ful execution is constant and can be determined deterministically.
Wallets such as Metamask also provides an estimate of gas cost for
the execution of function based on the same idea.
To gain a beer idea of the transaction costs involved in execut-
ing the major functionalities of our application, we rst obtain gas
requirements and then estimate their cost by taking a price of 1
Gwei (Giga-Wei) per gas. It may be noted that 1 billion Gwei is equal
to 1 ether and the price of 1 ether at the time of this experiment
(Dec 2019) is $144.30.
Using the data from Table 1, we calculate the total cost of a task
being posted to it being evaluated on our system. e total gas
required for this is calculated to be 1,502,066 which translates to $
Table 1: Gas requirement and cost of executing various func-
tions of our smart contract
Function Gas Cost estimate ($)
Create worker 229,786 0.0333
Create taskposter 228,410 0.0331
Post task with fees 250,502 0.0363
Create agreement 198,134 0.0287
Accept agreement 49,729 0.0072
Submit hash 114,068 0.0165
Assign evaluators 328,702 0.0477
First evaluation submit 133,073 0.0193
Second evaluation submit 105,620 0.0153
ird evaluation submit 274,360 0.0398
Become evaluator 47,878 0.0069
0.2178. e cost of registering as a worker or a task poster has not
been included in this since those costs are incurred only once.
During the course of the development of our smart contracts,
various options were explored for testing the smart contracts. One
method is to use soware such as ganache-cli that provide a local
version of Ethereum blockchain for testing. Another popular option
is to use test networks such as Rinkeby or Ropsten. ese test
networks work in a manner identical to the Ethereum main net and
only dier in the fact that ether on these networks do not actually
have any value and they are only used for testing.
7 ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN
In this section we explain how various objectives of our system are
fullled.
7.1 Privacy and Anonymity
Our system maintains the privacy of task submissions by using
asymmetric-key encryption techniques. Apart from the evaluators
and task poster, no other users will be able to view the submied
work. Rather than providing anonymity our platform does provide
pseudo-anonymity to its user by not linking an account with its
personally identiable information. Pseudo anonymity is inherited
from Blockchain. [33] provides anonymity by not linking trans-
actions from two dierent tasks. But this would fail to build trust
upon each other on the platform. As the actions performed by a
user in the past would not be known to the other users making it
easier for him/her to mislead others on the platform.
7.2 Decentralization
ere is no central authority in charge of running or maintain
data on the platform. All functions carried out by the users on the
platform are validated by the miners on the Ethereum network.
ere are incentives for the user to show good behavior and a
disincentive for malicious activities.
7.3 Robustness against various attacks
is section talks about how our design helps prevent or sometimes
avoid various aacks as mentioned in 3.1.
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• Unfair rating aack/ Bad mouthing
– A consensus among various evaluators is being taken.
e consensus mechanism involves removing out-
lier/s. e outlier here means the evaluator whose
evaluation score is not in line with the majority of
the evaluators. e nal rating does not consider the
score given by the outlier/s.
– e reputation of the evaluator is decreased or he/she
is given another task for evaluation if he/she is found
to be an outlier. is acts as a major deterrent for
giving a rating that is not consistent with the work
that is done by the peer worker.
• Reciprocity : Firstly the chances of geing selected as an
evaluator for that worker are less, given several evaluators
and secondly outliers are being dealt with while computing
the nal score for the worker, it will be tough for any
worker to reciprocate.
• Ballot Stung and collusion Aack : these are prevented by
providing a robust evaluation methodology as described
in the evaluation in section 4.
• White washing/ Re-entry / Sybil : is is prevented by
adding an initial entry fee to the platform. e amount
returned to the worker when he/she leaves the platform
depends on their reputation at that time.
• Cold Start Problem : we have some low paying tasks on
the platform that can be used as a starting point for new
workers.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we propose a distributed and secure crowdsourcing
platform with a robust reputation management scheme. e exist-
ing centralized schemes are susceptible to aacks on central servers
or misuse by the central authority. Using the blockchain based tech-
nique we build a platform that is less expensive than the existing,
does not rely on any third party and overcomes malicious manip-
ulation of reputation and various other aacks on the reputation
system. It also provides traceability, prevents unvalidated modi-
cation of data and gives a fair share of reward for the worker and
compensation for the task poster. e reputation score provided by
the system can be dependable due to immutability inherited by the
system from the blockchain. And we also provide Proof of concept
of our design by building the system on Ethereum test net.
However, further discussion is required on some of the points
and we keep them as our future work. Firstly, a more eective
technique of assigning submissions to a worker to evaluate can
be developed that can relate to the previous tasks that the worker
completes and can depend on how recently the worker has com-
pleted an evaluation. Secondly, there is a delay of 2.4 minutes on
average[10] while performing experiments between the creation
of a transaction and its conrmation by other nodes. is delay
is expected to reduce with the upcoming transaction scalability
updates in Ethereum[9]. irdly, doing computation on Ethereum
blockchain is very expensive and can be reduced by using com-
putational oracles that perform the computations o-blockchain
instead of doing it on blockchain but this is done at the cost of
incorporating centralization. Lastly, our design was based on peers
evaluating completed tasks and the task poster did not play any
role in this step. Possible modications can be explored that allow
the task poster to have a reputation score and for him/her to play a
greater role in the evaluation step.
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